

Why the Methods Matter:  
The Effectiveness of Party Contacting since the 1950s

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Abstract: This research examines the changing role of parties and interest groups in the electoral arena, and the resulting types of methods used for voter mobilization. I argue that the loss of a large volunteer base for parties in the late 20 Century has led them to use less personal contacting techniques; therefore they have been less effective than other groups that have been involved in voter mobilization. Using American National Election Studies (ANES) and Congressional Quarterly voting data, I perform both aggregate level and individual level analysis of the effectiveness voter contacting by parties and non-party groups, in national elections from 1956 to 2004. I show that the decreasingly labor-intensive and volunteer-based nature of voter mobilization activity by the political parties in the last half-century may explain much of the decline in nationwide turnout. In addition, voter contacting by political parties at the end of the century (from 1988-2000) may have been less effective than contacting by non-party entities.

Researchers have long known the benefits of mobilization for increasing voter turnout (Gosnell 1927; Katz and Lazarsfeld 1953; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Tilly 1978). It has often been noted that many otherwise potential voters often stay at home unless they are *asked* to participate by someone else; simply contacting a potential voter can mobilize that person to action (Fiorina 2002; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Voter contacting can be crucial to an electoral campaign, because voter mobilization has the potential to determine the outcome of an election. In light of the increasing closeness of recent national elections, many of those involved in electoral campaigns have increased their Get-Out-the-Vote (GOTV) activity since the late 1990s. In the most recent national elections, there has been noticeable growth in recent elections of the practice of “micro-targeting,” or individually identifying potential supporters by parties, candidates, and other groups involved in voter mobilization, using large and sophisticated databases of individual voter information. In recent elections, many of those involved in voter mobilization have been specifically targeting only those voters who are likely to support a favored candidate or political party at election-time, in an increasingly sophisticated manner.

Much of the existing research on voter mobilization has focused on the effectiveness of party contacting on turnout, over time, by examining the efficiency of voter targeting. Many previous studies of the effectiveness of party contacting from the 1950s to the 1990s have focused largely on changes in the effectiveness of targeting voters based on certain demographic characteristics (such as race, gender, religion, and union membership) and individual traits (such as voting history, socioeconomic status,

age, and education) (see Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, Abramson and Claggett 2001, Gershtenson 2003, Goldstein and Ridout 2002, Wielhower and Lockerbie 1994, Wielhower 2000). Existing research suggests that although the number of overall contacts fell from the 1950s to the 1990s, improvements in the targeting of potential voters have gradually increased the efficiency of party contacting, over time.

However, if party contacting has gotten more efficient over the years, has it gotten more *effective*? Has party contacting had as strong an effect on getting individuals to vote as it did in previous decades, once potential voters have been identified? It might depend on how those contacts were made. It has been suggested that changes in the methods by which voters have been mobilized in recent decades can also help to explain changes in voting behavior over time, including much of the observed decrease in voter turnout since the 1960s (see Kernell and Jacobson 2000, Putnam 2000, Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).<sup>1</sup> Specifically, the capital-intensive and impersonal nature of voter mobilization activity by the political parties in the last half-century may have led to declines in nationwide turnout over time. A half century ago, local Democratic and Republican Party organizations often engaged in extensive, personal door-to-door contacting efforts by party volunteers for both local and national elections (Aldrich 1995, Magleby 2000, Mayhew 1986, Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, Wielhower and Lockerbie 1994). However, in the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, these local party efforts declined dramatically for national elections. Many national electoral campaigns relied heavily on

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<sup>1</sup> McDonald and Popkin (2001) find that much of the existing research on turnout over time exaggerates that decline, by focusing on turnout among the voting age population (VAP) rather than the voting-eligible population (VEP). They find that, after accounting for increases in the proportion of adults who are ineligible to vote (for reasons such as felony convictions), the decline is much less dramatic. However, despite the measurement problems, even these researchers acknowledge that “the turnout rate outside the South is lower than in the 1950s and early 1960s” (p. 963).

capital-intensive TV advertising and on mobilization using recorded phone messages or mailers to mobilize voters, rather using the more effective *labor-intensive* personal face-to-face contacts of an earlier era (Coleman 1996, Fiorina 2002, Gerber and Green 2000, Green and Gerber 2004, Hayes 2000, Margolis 1993).<sup>2</sup>

One reason that the parties might have shifted away from more labor-intensive forms of electioneering in recent decades is because of the loss of the large volunteer based that they once had (see Aldrich 1995, Aldrich and Niemi 1996, Fiorina 2002). Without a steady supply of volunteers to implement a door-to-door campaign, the parties have had to rely on other non-labor-intensive Get-Out-the-Vote (GOTV) tactics and strategies, such as the use of TV and radio advertising, as well as automated phone banks and mass mailings. However, labor-intensive GOTV tactics have not completely disappeared, because of the increased role of interest groups in electoral politics. Since the 1960s and 1970s, political interest groups have been increasingly involved in assisting the day-to-day operation of recent campaigns, as well as the “ground war” of voter mobilization (Rozell, et al. 2006). Although the parties at every level have become increasingly well-coordinated in recent decades, they have been heavily dependent on outside interest groups for much of the man-power involved with assisting candidates’ campaigns at the grassroots. It has been noted that the Democratic Party has recently relied on labor unions and groups like the NAACP for mobilizing voters, while the Republicans have had a close working relationship with various Christian Right groups (see Bibby 1999, Herrnson 2005, Mayhew 1986, Wilcox and Larson 2006).

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<sup>2</sup> In *Get Out The Vote!: How to Increase Voter Turnout*, Green and Gerber (2004) show that canvassing can produce one additional vote for every fourteen people who are contacted, compared to one new vote for every 200 pieces of direct mail that are sent during a campaign.

These groups often have a steady supply of members who can be called upon to volunteer in a campaign. In fact, much of the door-to-door canvassing for lower level (including Congressional) races that was once performed by party volunteers has been replaced by the volunteer efforts of local chapters of non-party groups such as the AFL-CIO and the NAACP (Bibby 1999, Biersack and Viray 2005, Herrnson 2005, Magleby 2000).<sup>3</sup> These groups have often engaged in some of the more labor-intensive activities involved with an electoral campaign, due to their vast membership network of potential volunteers. Unlike the days when voter mobilization was performed primarily by volunteers in local party organizations, many modern GOTV efforts have been planned, developed, and implemented independently by various interest and advocacy groups, including both volunteers and professional canvassers hired by many of the new “527” groups made famous in the 2004 presidential election. In 2004 many 527 and 501(c) organizations led large, nationwide door-to-door voter mobilization drives and neighborhood canvassing efforts in key battleground states in the presidential election, as part of their effort to elect John Kerry as president. As several observers noted during the campaign in 2004, the door-to-door canvassing efforts of the various interest and advocacy groups were taking the place of those traditionally left to local party operations (Bai 2005, Hayes 2004, Meyerson 2005). At the presidential level, it was suggested that the new advocacy

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<sup>3</sup> Some researchers have also found that even with the changes in the nature of party organizations since WWII, local parties still conduct some important door-to-door canvassing for *state and local* races (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992, Frendeis and Gitelson 1999). While canvassing still exists, it is generally considered to be performed *at a much lower rate* than in earlier generations and conducted largely by *non-party groups* on a *much smaller scale* than in earlier times. There are also a number of professional canvassing groups, such as the state-level Public Interest Research Groups and the for-profit Grassroots, Inc. group, who have taken over much of the labor-intensive fundraising activities of the Democratic Party and other left-leaning interest groups (for a description of the activities of these organizations, see Fisher 2006).

groups were attempting to fill the face-to-face contacting void that was left by the parties thirty years ago:

...Since the '70s, presidential campaigns have centered on raising the massive funds needed to buy expensive television airtime... This emphasis on big media and big money meant that the grassroots, person-to-person campaigning traditionally at the core of the Democratic Party's strategy fell by the wayside... Political veterans now say that in this time of waning ratings and increased media saturation, TV ads no longer provide the value they once did... "It's never been done before on this level," says Steve Rosenthal, the former political director of the AFL-CIO and current president of America Coming Together ... "*It's something that the parties should have been doing but were neglecting...*" [emphasis added] (Hayes 2004)

As a result, Democratic National Committee took a concerted effort to increase its own labor-intensive, face-to-face mobilization efforts, by hiring the for-profit Grassroots, Inc. group to conduct its canvassing operations in 2004 (for a description of the activities of these organizations, see Fisher 2006).

### **Using Historical Survey Data to Examine Contact Quality**

In the past several election cycles, there has been a general recognition that the labor-intensive voter mobilization tactics of the past are not only effective, but they are generally better for mobilizing key supporters than the “air-war” tactics of the last two decades. Several researchers note that large membership organizations like the AFL-CIO and the NAACP began experimenting with large-scale door-to-door canvassing efforts shortly before 2004, due to an unfortunate lesson that was learned in the 1990s: although massive TV ad campaigns have the ability to mobilize supporters, they have the potential to mobilize *opposition voters* as well (Biersack and Viray 2003, Magleby 2000). It is

possible that an over-reliance on issue advertising in the 1990s, at the expense of more traditional face-to-face GOTV efforts, caused more harm than good for those seeking to get their supporters to the polls.

While campaign advertising has been a vital component of electoral strategies since the 1950s and 1960s, individual voter contacts have continued to be a preferred form of voter communication. In fact, starting in 1990, both parties began to increase their voter contacting efforts, after a decade-long decline. However, without the ability to conduct extensive door-to-door contacting efforts, it is likely that the contacts which they made in the 1990s were of a poorer quality than those a generation before.

Unfortunately, as Goldstein and Ridout (2002) note “we lack direct measures of a contact’s quality” over time (p. 27). Questions in the American National Election Studies have asked respondents since 1956 whether or not they were contacted by one of the political parties; however there have been no questions regarding *the exact nature* of the contact. Therefore, using survey data, we can only determine whether or not someone was contacted, and which party contacted them, but we have no truly reliable data on *how* individual respondents were contacted (and whether or not it was a face-to-face contact)<sup>4</sup>. As a result, much of the existing research on contact quality and the effectiveness of different GOTV methods has been cross-sectional, relying on field experiments and case studies rather than historical survey data (see Gerber and Green 2000a, 2000b; Niven 2001).

Yet, there is other information about the changing nature of voter contacting that can be derived from historical survey data. Questions regarding party volunteering have

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<sup>4</sup> Since 1980, there has been an additional question asking about additional contacts from anyone “other than someone from the two major parties,” but the exact identity of that contactor has not been asked (see appendix for exact question wording).

been asked since the 1950s. As responses from the American National Election Studies indicate, the number of people who have worked on behalf of a political party has declined dramatically in recent decades. Putnam (2000) has noted that by the mid-1990s, the number of people reporting volunteering for parties was half of what it was twenty years before, according to data in both the ANES and Roper polls. In fact, survey data appears to support much of the existing research regarding the evolution of party organizations in recent decades. Several researchers have noted the growing separation of party organizations from their volunteer base that has occurred during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Since the introduction of Civil Service reforms in the early part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, party patronage has dramatically declined (Aldrich 1995, Fiorina 2002). Once, when parties were responsible for distributing government jobs, voters had a material interest in becoming loyal party followers, as well as volunteers for the party at election-time. But during the 20<sup>th</sup> century, local party organizations lost much of their distributional power among voters, and thereby their power to recruit active volunteers.

[Insert Figure 1 about here]

By examining the diverging trends in the number of party volunteers and the percentage of potential voters being contacted, we can see some support for the suggestion that party contacting has gotten less labor-intensive (and therefore less personal) in recent decades. As Figure 1 indicates, from the 1950s to the late 1970s, the patterns of party volunteering and party contacting were fairly similar, following similar

upward and downward trends<sup>5</sup>. However, since the beginning of the 1980s, while the percentages of respondents reporting party contacts dropped dramatically (then rose dramatically in the late 1990s), the percentage of respondents reporting to have volunteered for a party or candidate declined (leveling off at around 3%, roughly half of where it was at the end of the 1960s). While party contacting activity has increased, it doesn't appear to be associated with an increase in party volunteering. Unless these fewer volunteers are making more contacts, these trends appear to support the suggestion that the parties have shifted away from volunteer based (and therefore labor-intensive) forms of electioneering in recent decades. Due to the increased reliance on direct mail, professional and pre-recorded phone banks, and TV advertising by most 20<sup>th</sup> century campaigns, this is likely the case.

At the same time, ANES data regarding *non-party contacts* seems to support the assertion that other, non-party entities took over much of the voter mobilization activity of the parties in the most recent decades<sup>6</sup>. As Figure 2 indicates, although not nearly as common as contacting by the Democratic and Republican parties, reported contacts by non-party entities appear to have increased throughout the 1990s, when levels of party

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<sup>5</sup> from ANES responses to the following:

"Did you do any {other} work for one of the parties or candidates?"

"Did anyone from one (1956,1960,1964,1966,1968: either) of the political parties call you up or come around and talk to you about the (1956,1960,1964,1966,1968: during the) campaign (1976ff: this year)?"

The years 1958 and 1962 were not included in the data, because these questions were not asked.

<sup>6</sup> From ANES responses to the following:

"Did anyone from one (1956,1960,1964,1966,1968: either) of the parties call you up or come around and talk to you about the (1956,1960,1964,1966,1968: during the) campaign (1976ff: this year)?"

(IF YES:) "Which party was that (1956,1960: were they from)?"

1980-2000:

"Other than someone from the two major parties, did anyone else call you up or come around and talk to you about supporting specific candidates in this last election?"

contacting (for both parties) were only beginning to rebound. When levels of party contacting increased dramatically at century's end, reported contacts by non-party entities declined.

[Insert Figure 2 about here]

## **Hypotheses**

In light of the fact that personal, volunteer based methods have been found to be more effective than impersonal methods (see Green and Gerber 2004, Gerber and Green 2000), it is likely that the increasingly capital-intensive nature of party contacting has made it less effective than it was in the past, despite improvements in targeting likely voters. Assuming that most party volunteering is for mobilization activity (manning phone banks, going door to door, distributing fliers, etc.), as parties relied less on volunteers for their electoral activities, those activities should have had less of an effect on turnout. By examining changing patterns in reported party volunteering over time, we can get an indirect measure of the labor-intensive nature of party activity at the aggregate level. In this research, it is proposed that a decrease in the number of people volunteering for parties at election-time has had a negative impact on the effectiveness of party mobilization efforts since the 1950s. Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Differences between levels of party volunteering and party contacting in a given year has a negative effect on overall turnout.

Secondly, in light of the fact that much of the labor-intensive contacting that was once performed by parties is now performed by non-party groups (Bibby 1999, Biersack and Viray 2005, Herrnson 2005, Magleby 2000), it is also expected that contacts by these groups have had a positive effect on turnout. And as non-party groups began to perform most of the face-to-face activity involved in voter mobilization at the end of the century, it is likely that their contacts were more effective than those of the political parties.

Therefore, I propose the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2: Non-party contacting has a positive effect on turnout.

Hypothesis 3: Non-party contacting has had a greater positive effect on turnout than party contacting.

## **Data and Methods**

The initial analysis examines the effect of this growing gap on aggregate national voter turnout over the last half-century. The second section of the analysis compares the effect of party and non-party contacting on the individual turnout decision among voters at century's end, before the reinstatement of traditional door-to-door canvassing by both interest groups and political parties. Although there have been no specific questions involving methods of contact in the ANES until recently, by examining the aggregate level changes in volunteering and contacting combined, we can get an indirect measure of the labor-intensity of party contacting in the last half-century. For the main independent variable, a measure of the "Party Volunteering/ Contacting Gap" can be created using ANES data:<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> from ANES responses to the following:

$$\text{Volunteering/Contacting Gap} = \text{Absolute value } |\% \text{ of population volunteering for parties/candidates} - \% \text{ of population contacted by parties}|$$

For the initial analysis, the dependent variable was a simple measure of aggregate national turnout in each presidential and Congressional election from 1956 to 2004, obtained from Congressional Quarterly voting data:<sup>8</sup>

$$\% \text{ Turnout} = \% \text{ of Voting-Age Population casting votes in both presidential and congressional elections}$$

Controls on turnout include a dummy variable for mid-term elections, and reported disinterest in campaign activity<sup>9</sup> (from ANES responses, aggregated by year). This section of analysis has an N of 20 (one for each election year included).<sup>10</sup> Although not as precise as an examination of the effect of contacting at the individual level, analysis of aggregate level turnout is the most appropriate way to determine the effect of volunteer-based contacting, due to the lack of information about the exact nature of individual contacts.

[Insert Table 1 about here]

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"Did you do any {other} work for one of the parties or candidates?"; "Did anyone from one (1956,1960,1964,1966,1968: either) of the political parties call you up or come around and talk to you about the (1956,1960,1964,1966,1968: during the) campaign (1976ff: this year)?"

The years 1958 and 1962 were not included in the data, because these questions were not asked.

<sup>8</sup> Since this analysis is done using aggregated survey responses for the main independent variable, the data for the dependent data came from actual turnout data, to ensure that those reporting to have volunteered for a party or candidate were not directly affecting the measurement of aggregate yearly turnout.

<sup>9</sup> Since interest in the campaign is generally coded as "very interested," "interested," and "not interested," the latter was chosen as the control variable in order to differentiate between non-interest and varying levels of positive interest.

<sup>10</sup> 1958, 1962, 1966, 1970, 1974 were not included due to lack of data for one or more variables

Table 1 indicates that the Volunteering/Contacting Gap has a statistically significant negative effect on national turnout, as expected. It appears that increases in the value of this measure from election to election lead to decreases in nationwide turnout. This provides support to Hypothesis 1 and the assertion that party volunteering and its relationship to party contacting has an effect on turnout. Although the parsimonious nature of this model limits its interpretive power, both a Durbin-Watson test and Breusch-Godfrey test indicated that there was not significant autocorrelation in the residuals. Therefore, we can be fairly certain of the reliability of the model. Alternative specifications of the model were also tested, including separate measures of volunteering and party contacting rather than the volunteering/contacting gap measure. In each of these alternative models, the coefficient for volunteering was positive and statistically significant (as expected). In addition, since it is suggested that the capital-intensive nature of modern party activity (at the expense of labor-intensive contacting tactics) leads to decreases in turnout, an additional control for inflation adjusting spending on political advertising (in millions of dollars) was included in the model. Although the data for this measure were only available for the years 1970-2004 (reducing the number of observations to 10), the inclusion of the spending control did not significantly alter the effect of the other variables.

The second part of the analysis, comparing the effects of party and non-party contacting, was performed at the individual level. Because there is more reliable data about the exact identity of the contactor for each reported contact, this analysis employed

a pooled logit model of the individual turnout decision, for the years 1988 to 2000.<sup>11</sup> The dependent variable for this part of the analysis is the turnout decision (coded 1 if the respondent voted, 0 if not). The main independent variables are contact by a non-party entity, Democratic Party contact, Republican Party contact, as well as a variable indicating contact by both a party and a non-party entity (coded 1, 0 for each). Additional controls include separate dummy variables indicating whether a respondent registered to vote, whether a respondent voted in the last presidential election; additional demographic controls for respondents' age, gender, race, education, region (south, non-south), household union membership, religion, homeownership, and marital status; as well as controls for reported interest in the election, external efficacy, and retrospective and prospective economic evaluations.<sup>12</sup> Lastly, fixed effects for year were included as separate dummy variables for each election.

[Insert Table 2 about here]

The results of the first individual level analysis are shown in Table 2. Overall, both of the remaining hypotheses posed were supported by the results of the analysis. The effect of non-party contacting was positive and statistically significant (lending support to Hypothesis 2), and the measure for non-party contacting appears to be slightly

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<sup>11</sup> The 1988-2000 elections were chosen as the dates for this analysis, due to the fact that this was a time-period of increasing non-party contacting (indicated by Figure 2), as well as the fact that certain data were missing for multiple variables in the 1982-1986 time period, including controls for past voting. An alternative model was run without this control, allowing for the use of the 1984 and 1986 data. The results were largely the same, although the effect of the non-party contacting measure was slightly less. Due to the substantive importance of past voting as an influence on voting, the original model was left intact.

<sup>12</sup> Due to lack of consistency in questions asked each year, there was no control for internal efficacy. In addition, the economic evaluation controls reflected personal finances rather than macroeconomic evaluations. A description of the coding of each control variable is available from the author upon request.

greater than that of a Democratic Party contact, as predicted. This lends support to Hypothesis 3, even though the substantive difference in the effects is minor. However, the effect of the Republican Party contacting measure appears to be greater than that of non-party contacting (contrary to Hypothesis 3). Yet, as a whole, the findings indicate that the effect of contacts performed by political parties were not as great as those of non-party groups. From what we know of the personal, face-to-face nature of recent interest group mobilization activity, it is likely that these results are capturing some of that discrepancy.

A Pearson test for goodness-of-fit indicates that the model is appropriately fitted to the data. However, it should be noted that these results only indicate that entities other than the political parties have a strong contact effect. Due to the lack of follow-up questions in the ANES, we do not know the *exact identity* of who these entities are. Therefore, it is possible that these results can only indicate the weak electoral effect of contacts made by political parties during this time period, rather than the strength of an interest group contact (which is suggested by the arguments posed here). Alternative specifications of the model were also tested on various categories of respondents, in order to get a better idea of what these findings indicate. In light of the fact that the NAACP and labor groups are known to mobilize voters from within their own ranks, separate analyses were run using only black or union respondents. In addition, due to the increase of the mobilization of evangelical Christians by like-minded groups through the 1990s, a separate analysis was performed using only this sample. In each of the follow-up analyses, the coefficient for non-party contacts and one or both of the major party contacts was not statistically significant.

## **Discussion and Conclusions**

As noted previously, there has been a considerable amount of research on the effects of voter mobilization of the turnout decision. Political scientists and campaign strategists have known that Get-Out-the-Vote efforts not only increase voter turnout, but they can be the decisive factor in an otherwise close, or undecided election. And, for much of electoral history, political parties have been largely responsible for communicating with voters and getting them to the polls. For that reason, much of the previous research on voter mobilization has been on the effects of party contacting on turnout, including changes in the effect of the party contact over time (Abramson and Claggett 2001, Gershtenson 2003, Goldstein and Ridout 2002, Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, Wielhower and Lockerbie 1994, Wielhower 2000).

At the same time, there has been another line of voter mobilization research in recent years focusing on the methods of voter mobilization. Overall, researchers have been finding that personalized approaches are a far more effective way to mobilize voters than some of the more dominant, impersonal methods used in recent decades. As a result, many of the traditional tactics used by party machines more than a generation ago now appear to be more efficient than the high tech methods of voter communication that were used since the 1970s and 1980s. Therefore, it is possible that despite improvements in targeting potential voters, recent methods of party contacting have been of lower quality than before.

Has the quality of voter contacting by political parties gotten worse over time? Due to the nature of party contacting questions asked in the ANES, few previous studies

have examined the effect of contact quality, historically. Although there are substantial data limitations that might prevent extensive survey research in this area, historical survey data contains a wealth of relevant information that may help to shed some light on this question. As this research shows, information on changing levels of party volunteering and the presence of other non-party entities in the mobilization environment is readily available, and it can help researchers to get a better understanding of the changing nature of party contacting. This research suggests that as the electoral activities of the major political parties have become less volunteer-based, they have become less effective overall, as well as less effective than the efforts of other groups.

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Figure 1: The Party Volunteering/Contacting Gap




Figure 2: Overall Contacting Trends  
(by Party and Non-party Entities)




Table 1: Effect of the Party Volunteering/Contacting Gap  
on Aggregate National Turnout (1956-2004)

Measure	coeff.	t	Std.Error	Signif.
Volunteering/Contacting Gap	-1.56**	-2.85	.547	(.012)
% of the Population Contacted	1.43*	2.42	.588	(.028)
Midterm (1, 0)	-17.87**	-7.94	2.25	(.000)
% of the Population Reporting Disinterest in the Campaign	-.336	-1.34	.251	(.200)
(constant)	(61.65)		(8.97)	(.000)

N=20

Adj. R<sup>2</sup>=.925

\*Significant at .05 level

\*\*Significant at .01 level

Table 2: Effects of Party and Non-party Contacting on Voter Turnout (1988-2000)

turnout (1,0)	b	Std. E.	z	P>:z:
Non-party Contact	.284*	.143	1.98	.048
Democratic Contact	.280**	.103	2.72	.007
Republican Contact	.347**	.100	3.46	.001
Pty+Nonpty Contact	-.093	.168	-0.55	.582
Past Vote	1.84**	.085	21.60	.000
Registered	3.86**	.141	27.29	.000
Age	.000	.002	0.19	.846
Gender (1=F)	.040	.065	0.61	.540
Black	-.020	.096	-0.20	.839
Union	.167	.087	1.91	.056
Religion	-.006	.033	-0.18	.858
Homeowner	-.208**	.075	-2.78	.006
Married	.201**	.069	2.93	.003
Interest	.519**	.047	11.17	.000
Efficacy	.105**	.038	2.77	.006
Retrospective Econ	.031	.041	0.77	.442
Prospective Econ	-.095	.054	-1.75	.080
f.e. 1988	-.354*	.148	-2.39	.017
f.e. 1990	-3.87**	.142	-27.3	.000
f.e. 1992	.245	.149	1.65	.099
f.e. 1994	-1.48**	.140	-10.6	.000
f.e. 1996	-.423**	.150	-2.81	.005
f.e. 1998	-1.75**	.146	-12.0	.000
f.e. 2000	-.207	.155	-1.34	.182
(constant)	-8.35	.434	-19.2	.000

N=10115

LR chi<sup>2</sup> (26) = 6127.06

Prob > chi<sup>2</sup> = .0000

pseudo R<sup>2</sup> = .4791

\*Significant at .05 level

\*\*Significant at .01 level

Logistic model for turnout, goodness-of-fit test

Number of observations = 10115

Number of covariate patterns = 10103

Pearson chi<sup>2</sup> (10076) = 20708.47

Prob > chi<sup>2</sup> = .0000